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this possibility occurs only when the law of another state is
unsettled, the practitioner is advised to refrain from bringing suit
in New York until the issues of retroactivity and tolling are
resolved in a foreign suit.
ARTICLE

3-

JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE
OF COURT

CPLR 302(a) (1).:

Section held applicable to non-conmercial
transactions of business.

A distinct conflict has developed as to whether the transaction

of business of a non-commercial character lies within the ambit of
CPLR 302 (a) (1). In Willis v. Willis,8 the supreme court, New
York County, held that as a matter of legislative intent the
execution of a separation agreement in New York did not confer
jurisdiction on the courts of this state under CPLR 302(a) (1).
The court construed the word "business" in the statute to apply
solely to "commercial" transactions.
The supreme court, Nassau County, has not acceded to this
view of the statute. In Todd v. Todd,9 the court, while holding
service under CPLR 308 invalid, indicated by way of dictum that
"there may well be a basis for maintaining the action in New
York, for the separation agreement was apparently entered into
in New York. . . ." '0 In a more recent case, Kochenthal v.
Kochenthal,11 the court directly confronted this issue and refused
to adhere to the Willis decision. The court stated that it did "not
hold to the belief that the statute . . . must be so narrowly con-

strued as to be applicable only to pecuniary transactions of a
commercial nature." 12

The court in Kochenthal attempted to distinguish Willis on
the basis of the fact that the defendant in Kochenthal was a resident
of New York at the time of the execution and negotiation of the

agreement and had subsequently left the state, whereas Willis
842 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).

951 Misc. 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
See also The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN's L.
REv. 644, 646 (1967).
10 Todd v. Todd, 51 Misc. 2d 94, 96, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1966). The supreme court, Monroe County, while dismissing
a suit based on a separation agreement for failure to state a cause of action,
has also stated in dictum that it is not convinced of the validity of the
Willis decision. Raschitore v. Fountain, 52 Misc. 2d 402, 275 N.Y.S.2d 709
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1966).
1152 Misc. 2d 437, 275 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
12 Id. at 441, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
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involved a defendant who was a nonresident at the time of execution. It then proceeded to enumerate certain factual circumstances
which tended to indicate a sufficient contact with the state to support the assumption of jurisdiction. 13 However, the issue in
Kochenthal was not whether there were sufficient contacts to constitutionally support jurisdiction, but whether CPLR 30 2(a) (1)
authorized the assumption of jurisdiction by the courts in cases
involving non-commercial transactions of business.
It would seem that, absent a clear declaration of legislative
intent, there is little reason to assume that the word "business"
in the statute was meant to preclude non-commercial transactions.
Substantial negotiations, both financial and otherwise, culminating
in a separation agreement would appear to be transactions of
business within the scope of 302(a)(1).
CPLR 308(3).: Tnterpretation of "usual place of abode:'
In Rich Prods. Corp. v. Diamond,'14 service of process was
made pursuant to CPLR 308(3) by mailing a copy of the
summons, with return receipt requested, and affixing a copy to
the main entrance of defendant's residence in Buffalo, New York.
Defendant moved to vacate service on the ground that he had
changed his domicile to the state of Michigan two days prior
to the first attempt at service, and had not been physically present
in New York since that date. The supreme court, Erie County,
held that the defendant had failed to meet his burden of proof
on the issue of change of domicile as he had not shown that the
out-of-state facilities he had rented were "complete, adequate,
furnished or occupied by him." 15
Defendant relied principally on the fact that he had rented
an apartment on a one-year lease in Michigan which he intended
to make his home; that he had filed a certificate of incorporation
in Michigan; and that he had registered his automobile in that
state. In the face of these allegations, plaintiff's affidavit noted
that defendant was a registered voter in Erie County; that he was
the owner of record of a residence in New York worth approximately $56,000 which was apparently in use at the time of
service; that he was currently listed in the city's directory; that
he was being billed for a telephone at that address; and that he
maintained a checking account at a local bank. It was further
indicated that the defendant had not moved his personalty from
New York to Michigan on the alleged date of his change of
domicile, nor had he done so at any other time.
Id. at 443, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
'd 51 Misc. 2d 675, 273 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1966).
tr Id. at 678, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
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